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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE

OF COUNSEL-DEFENDANT'S

ABILITY TO CONSULT COUNSEL DURING A BRIEF RECESS BETWEEN DIRECT AND CROSS-EXAMINATION-The United States Supreme Court

announced that the Federal Constitution does not compel every
trial judge to allow the defendant to consult with his attorney during the course of a brief recess called during the defendant's
testimony.
Perry v. Leeke, 109 S.Ct. 594 (1989).
Donald Ray Perry was indicted and convicted for his participation in the March 5, 1981 murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault
of Dr. Mary Heimberger.1 During the course of the bifurcated
trial,2 evidence was offered that Perry was mildly retarded and
that he was a nonviolent person who could be easily influenced by
others. 3 Perry eventually took the stand to testify on his own
behalf. 4
After Perry completed his direct testimony, the trial judge declared a 15-minute recess and ordered that Perry be prohibited
from talking to anyone, including his attorney, during the break.5
Following the recess, Perry's attorney moved for a mistrial.' The
trial judge denied the motion, reasoning that Perry "was in a sense
. . . a ward of the Court.

. . [and]

was not entitled to be cured or

assisted or helped approaching his cross examination."'7 Perry was
subsequently convicted. 8
Perry appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of South
Carolina. 9 In affirming Perry's conviction, the South Carolina Su1. State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324 (1983).
2. A bifurcated trial is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows: "Trial of issues
separately, e.g... guilt and sanity in a criminal trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 148 (5th ed.
1979).
3. Perry v. Leeke, 109 S.Ct. 594, 596 (1989).
4. Perry, 299 S.E.2d at 325. At the trial, the defense called a number of witnesses
including Perry himself. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Perry's attorney moved for a mistrial claiming that the judge's order preventing Perry from having any consultation with his lawyer during the fifteen minute recess
denied him adequate assistance of counsel. Id.
7. Id.at 327, quoting Appellant's Brief at 4-5].
8. State v. Perry, 278 S.C. 490, 299 S.E.2d 324 (1983).
9. 278 S.C. 490, 99 S.E.2d 324 (1983). The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
Perry's conviction with two Justices concurring and one Justice filing a dissenting opinion.
Id.
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preme Court relied on the Second Circuit's reasoning in United
States v. DiLapi.10 Specifically, in DiLapi, the court held that the
denial of the opportunity to consult with counsel during a five
minute recess did not serve to prejudice the defendant." Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that Geders v.
United States12 was not controlling because that case dealt specifically with the right to confer with counsel during an overnight recess and not with limitations imposed in other circumstances.' 3
The court further reiterated that it attached significance to the
phrase "normally confer" as used by Mr. Justice Burger in Geders,
noting that counsel is not normally permitted to confer with his
14
defendant between direct and cross examination.
Justice Ness of the South Carolina Supreme Court pointed out
in his dissenting opinion, 5 that a defendant would normally confer
with his lawyer during a short routine recess and therefore Geders
should apply.' 6 Justice Ness concluded his opinion by noting that a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel outweighs the value
7
of preventing the lawyer from coaching during a brief recess.'
10. 651 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). In DiLapi, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to consider whether the instruction barring the
defendant from any discussion during a five minute recess violated his Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel. 651 F.2d at 142. The court concluded that the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights were obviously in effect and noted that, " he may consult with
counsel during any recess so long as the orderly conduct of the trial [was] not impaired." Id.
at 148. The court held that it was indeed error to bar a defendant from consulting with his
counsel during any instance, but in this case however, failure to do so did not cause actual
prejudice. Id.
11. Id.
12. 425 U.S. 80 (1976). In Geders, the trial judge instructed counsel and client to
refrain from conferring with each other during an overnight recess. 425 U.S. at 82. Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, speaking for the court, held sequestration under these circumstances to be
reversible error stating:
The challenged order prevented petitioner from consulting his attorney during a
17-hour overnight recess, when an accused would normally confer with counsel. We
need not reach, and we do not deal with, limitations imposed in other circumstances.
We hold that an order preventing the petitioner from consulting his counsel "about
anything" during a 17-hour overnight recess between his direct- and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.
Id. at 91
13. Perry v. Leeke, 109 S.Ct. at 596.
14. Id. at 597. The South Carolina Supreme Court further suggested that if the defendant's counsel should request a recess after direct examination so that he may talk with
his client before cross-examination begins, a judge would normally deny the request. Id.
15. State v. Perry, 299 S.E.2d at 327.
16. Id.
17. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 597.
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Subsequently, Perry sought and obtained a federal writ of
habeas corpus."8 Relying upon the Fourth Circuit Court's opinion
in United States v. Allen', the District Court in Perry issued the
writ noting that even though there is no right to be coached on
cross-examination, the defendant does in fact have a right to counsel during a short recess and he need not demonstrate prejudice in
order to have the decision reversed. 20 The Court of Appeals, sitting
en banc, reversed the District Court's decision. 2 Relying upon
United States v. Cronic22 and Strickland v. Washington23, the
Court of Appeals noted that trial errors of this kind are not so
prejudicial as to warrant an automatic reversal of a conviction.2 4
Specifically, the court held that the petitioner's conviction should
stand because Perry offered no evidence that his testimony on
cross-examination would have been different had he been given the
opportunity to consult with his lawyer during the recess.2 5
Perry filed a petition for certiorari which the United States Supreme Court granted.2 6 Justice Stevens, who delivered the majority
opinion, 27 noted there was merit in Perry's argument that a show18. Id. at 595.
19. 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179 (1977). In
Allen, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the Supreme Court's opinion in Geders
and held the trial judge's court order preventing the defendant from consulting his counsel
during two short recesses taken during the course of his direct testimony, deprived him of
his right to assistance of counsel. 542 F.2d at 633.
20. Perry,109 S.Ct. at 597.
21. Id. See Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987).
22. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, when respondent's retained counsel withdrew
shortly before the scheduled trial date, the District Court appointed an inexperienced lawyer and allowed only 25 days to prepare for trial, even though the government had taken
over four and one-half years to investigate the case. 466 U.S. at 649. The respondent was
convicted, but the Court of Appeals reversed, inferring that the respondent's right to effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment had been violated. Id. at 652. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to be successful, the defendant must show specific errors made by trial
counsel. Id. at 666.
23. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Supreme Court in Strickland held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel, and the standard
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be, " whether counsel's conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result." 466 U.S. at 686.
24. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 597.
25. Id. The Court also noted after reviewing the record, that the evidence presented
by the prosecution against Perry was "overwhelming". Id.
26. 109 S.Ct. at 98-99. The Supreme Court granted Certiorari at 485 U.S. , 108
S.Ct. 1269, (1988).
27. 109 S.Ct. at 596-602. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Kennedy joined in part and filed a concurring
opinion in part. Id.at 602. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 28:211

ing of prejudice is not an essential component of a violation of the
rule announced in Geders.28 Referring to the Sixth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution,2 9 the court in Geders simply reversed the
defendant's conviction without considering whether any actual
prejudice resulted from the defendant's denial of access to his lawyer during the overnight recess" Furthermore, this decision was
also consistent with the court's later decision in Strickland v.
Washington where the court held that the standard for determining if counsel's assistance to his client was so inadequate that it
effectively deprived the client of his Sixth Amendment protection,
is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.3 1 The Court further reiterated that a
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and
that deficient performance prejudiced the defense.32 The Supreme
Court therefore rejected the Fourth Circuit Court's reasoning stating that the standard for determining actual or constructive denial
of the assistance of counsel is not the same as the standard that is
applied in determining whether the quality of a lawyer's perform33
ance itself has been constitutionally ineffective.
Instead the Court focused on the fact that when a defendant becomes a witness, he has no constitutional right to consult with his
lawyer while he is testifying.3 The court noted that the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witness against him immunizes him from the possibility of physical sequestration; never
the less, when he assumes the role of witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnesses are applicable to him also.3 5 The
court distinguished its decision in Geders by noting that the overnight recess in Geders is of a different character than that of a
fifteen minute recess between direct and cross examination. 3 SpeBrennan and Blackmun joined. Id. at 602.
28. Id. at 598.
29. The right to assistance of counsel is set fourth in the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution as follows: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
30. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
31. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686.
32. Id. at 687.
33. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 600.
34. Id. at 600.
35. Id. at 600-01. The Court specifically noted that a witness has an absolute right to
consult his counsel before taking the stand, but once he begins to testify, he has no right to
have the testimony interrupted in order to benefit from counsel's advice. Id.
36. 109 S.Ct. at 602. In Geders, the defendant was ordered by the trial judge to re-
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cifically, the court explained that the normal consultation between
attorney and client that occurs during an overnight recess would
probably include matters other than the defendant's own testimony which are matters that the defendant does have a constitutional right to discuss with his attorney. 7 Furthermore, the Court
noted that it is the defendant's constitutional right to consult his
counsel on a number of trial-related matters during the course of a
long recess.38
Justice Stevens summarized the court's holding by noting that
the truth seeking function of the trial is better served by a witness
who is uncounseled between direct and cross examination as opposed to a witness who is given time to stop and consult with his
attorney. 9 Furthermore, the court held that after the trial judge
has listened to the witness' direct testimony, it is entirely within
his discretion to decide that cross examination is more likely to
elicit truthful responses if it is conducted without allowing the witness an opportunity to consult third parties.4 °
Justice Kennedy joined the majority in part and concurred in
the judgment.4 1 Specifically he joined in the judgment but disagreed with the majority discussion as to whether prejudice must
be shown when the right to counsel is denied. 4' He stated that he
would not address the issue and therefore declined to join in that
part of the opinion. "3
Justice Marshall with whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun
joined, filed a dissenting opinion." Justice Marshall disagreed with
the majority opinion claiming that there was no constitutional
grounding for the majority's distinction between a short recess and
a long recess.4 5 He maintained that every Court of Appeals to consider this issue since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Geders,
has concluded that a bar on attorney-defendant contact, even durfrain from consulting his counsel "about anything" during a 17-hour overnight recess. 425
U.S. at 85, n.1.
37. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 602.
38. Id., (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. at 88, 96 S.Ct. at 1335).
39. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 601.
40. Id. The Court stated that this reasoning applies to all witnesses including those
who are non-defendants. Id.
41. Id. at 602.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Justice Stevens in concluding his majority opinion eluded to the fact that a
"short recess" would consist of an interruption lasting only a "few minutes". Id.

216
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ing a brief recess, is impermissible if objected to by counsel."
Justice Marshall further criticized the majority opinion noting
the Court's long expressed view that the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the assistance of counsel includes the defendant's right to
confer with counsel about all aspects of his case. 47 In part 'A' of his
dissenting opinion 8 , Justice Marshall also questioned the majority's authority for its "general rul[e]" forbidding attorney and wit-9
ness contact between a witness' direct and cross examination.4
The Justice noted the presence of contrary authority to the majority's claim that settled practice made the defendant's expectations
that he would be able to speak with his lawyer during a brief recess
unreasonable.5 0 He further claimed that the majority's rule was
regularly breached when the state's witnesses were able to consult
with anyone, including the prosecutors, during these breaks.6 ' The
Justice concluded Part 'A' of his dissent by pointing out that even
if the majority is correct in its assertion that it is routine practice
for trial courts to bar attorney -witness contact between direct and
cross-examination, the Court is ignoring the fact that defendants
enjoy additional rights under the Sixth Amendment. 2
In Part 'B' of his dissenting opinion, 53 Justice Marshall criticized
the majority's claim that attorney-client contact during a short re46. Id. at 602-03 (citing Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 1323 (1989)). In Sanders, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a
Court order preventing the defendant from consulting his attorney during a lunch recess
denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. 861 F.2d at 1033.
The Court noted that every circuit court to consider this question has found that a bar on
attorney-defendant consultation during even a brief recess can violate the defendant's right
to counsel. Id. at 1035 (citing United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct. 1428 (1982), Perry v. Leeke, 832 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1987),
United States v. Conway, 632 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1980), United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d
1035 (6th Cir. 1976), United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1978), and Crutchfield
v.Wainwright, 803 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 3235
(1987)).
47. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 603, (citing the majority opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64 (1932)). In Powell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant that is charged with a
capital offense the right to have the aid of counsel for his defense. 287 U.S. at 68-71.
48. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 603.
49. Id. at 604.
50. Id..at 604, n.1.
51. 109 S.Ct. at 604. Justice Marshall pointed out that in nearly every post-Geders
case cited by the majority, no witness for the State was ever barred from speaking with the
prosecutor or their attorney. Id., (citing n.2).
52. Id. at 605. Justice Marshall specifically noted that the Court in Geders recognized
the defendant's "unique status". Id., (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. at 88, 96 S.Ct.
at 1335).
53. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 605.
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cess between direct and cross-examination will "retard the truth
seeking function of the trial.""" He went on to point out that the
ability to consult legal counsel during every stage of the "adversary
process" serves only to enhance the truth seeking function of
trial.5 5 He further noted that if consultations between direct and
cross examination do in fact threaten the trial's truth seeking function, the bar order issued during the 17 hour recess in Geders
should have been sustained.50 The Justice perceived that the majority's fears about attorney-witness
contact during a recess are
"vastly overstated". 7 He further suggested that the ability of
counsel to offer a "few soothing words" to a nervous defendant
should only help to increase the likelihood that the defendant's
testimony would be truthful.5 8 He also claimed that it was unreasonable to assume that attorney-defendant conversations regarding
the availability of other witnesses, trial tactics, or even the possibility of a plea bargain do not take place during brief recesses.5
The Justice further criticized the majority opinion by noting
that although the Court expressly recognized a defendant's constitutional right to discuss matters that go beyond the content of his
own testimony, the Court fails to require that trial judges permit
attorney-defendant contact "during all recesses" regardless of their
duration, "so long as trial testimony is not discussed." 60 He specifically noted that during the recess, Perry may very well have discussed matters other than those relating to his testimony, but instead he was denied this constitutional right."1
Justice Marshall was of the opinion that the majority's decision
left it up to the trial judge " 'to guess whether she has committed a
54. Id.
55. Id. Justice Marshall reiterated that this belief was central to the Court's Sixth
Amendment doctrine as was suggested by Justice Stevens in Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.-,
109 S.Ct. 346, 352 (1988). Id. at 605-606.
56. 109 S.Ct at 606.
57. Id.
58. Id. Justice Marshall noted that the ability of counsel to calm the defendant
should be particularly valuable in this case, noting that Perry being described as "mildly
retarded", was on trial for his life. Id.
59. Id. at 607.
60. Id. at 608.
61. Id. Justice Marshall further expressed concern with the majority's belief that it is
possible to distinguish between discussions regarding trial strategy from those discussions
regarding testimony. Id. at 608 n.8. The Justice further noted that the majority's failure to
spell out the difference between these two types of discussion may "have a chilling effect on
cautious attorneys, who might avoid giving advice on non-testimonial matters for fear of
violating [a court order barring recess discussions of testimonial matters]." Id., (citing Mudd
v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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constitutional violation' when she issues a recess bar order."62 Finally, the Justice noted that the failure of the majority to provide
a practical framework in which to answer these questions would
'63
subject defendants to "inconsistent practices.
The development of the right to counsel began with the
landmark case of Powell v. Alabama.6 4 In Powell, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether criminal defendants were
guaranteed the right to counsel by the United States Constitution. " The Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 6 6 guaranteed the assistance of counsel to criminal defendants 67 charged with committing capital offenses.6 8
Specifically, the court noted that notice and hearing, along with a
competent tribunal having proper jurisdiction over the case, make
up basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due process
of law. 9 The Powell Court reiterated that a hearing has always
included the right to the aid of counsel and that the right to be
heard would tend to be of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel.70 The Court also held that the defendant's right to counsel encompasses more than the right to the
mere presence of an attorney; rather, that the government's duty
62. Perry, 109 U.S. at 608, (citing Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d at 1037).
63. Id.
64. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 49. Mr. Justice Butler filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 73.
65. Id. at 52. Powell involved a state criminal proceeding where two young black men
were indicted for raping two white girls during a train ride through Alabama. 287 U.S. at 49.
Upon return of the indictment, the defendants were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Id.
They were not asked whether they had, or were able to employ counsel, or whether they
wished the court appoint counsel for them. Id. at 52. Six days after the defendants were
indicted, the trial began. Id. at 53. While the state's attorney general was ready to prosecute, the defendant's had no counsel representing them. Id. Subsequently, Mr. Roddy, a
Tennessee lawyer, addressed the court and offered to assist counsel that the court would
appoint. Id. The court responded by stating that if Mr. Roddy was willing to appear for the
defendants, the court would not appoint counsel. Id. The Court noted that all members of
the bar were appointed for the purpose of arraigning the defendants and that it assumed
that they would continue to help them if no counsel appeared. Id. The juries found the
defendants guilty and imposed the death penalty on both defendants. Id. at 50. The trial
court over-ruled motions for new trials and sentenced the defendants in accordance with the
verdicts. Id. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgments. 224 Ala. 524, 141 So. 215
(1932).
66. The Fourteenth Amendment states that: "No State shall . . .deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
67. Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
68. Id. at 71. In delivering the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Sutherland noted that
the Court's decision was limited specifically to capital cases. Id.
69. Id. at 68.
70. Id. at 68-69.
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to appoint counsel for indigent defendants "is not discharged by
an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances as to
preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and the trial
of the case."' 1
Six years later in Johnson v. Zerbst7 2 , the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue involving the right to counsel in federal
prosecutions and specifically held that the right to counsel in federal prosecutions was based on Sixth Amendment 73 guarantees.7 4 It
was not until 1963, in Gideon v. Wainright 5, that the Supreme
Court held that the right to counsel in both state and federal trials
is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 6 In Gideon, the court
overruled its decision in Betts v. Brady,7 claiming that the right to
counsel for anyone charged with a crime is indeed a fundamental
71. Id. at 71.
72. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In Johnson, the indigent petitioner was indicted for passing
counterfeit twenty dollar bills. Id. at 460. He was subsequently tried, convicted and sentenced without the assistance of counsel. Id. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied Johnson's request for a writ of habeas corpus. 13 F. Supp. 253 (N.D.
Ga. 1935). Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
decision. 92 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1937). The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari. 303
U.S. 629 (1938). Mr. Justice Black in writing the majority opinion noted that the right to
counsel in federal prosecutions was based on the Sixth Amendment. 304 U.S. at 462-63.
73. The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend.
VI.
74. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63.
75. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the petitioner was charged in a Florida State
Court with a noncapital felony and due to his lack of funds asked the Court to appoint an
attorney for him. Id. at 336-37. The Court denied his request on the ground that state law
permitted appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases only. Id. The
petitioner conducted his own defense and was convicted and sentenced to prison. Id. He
then petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that his
conviction violated his rights under the Federal Constitution. Id. The Florida Supreme
Court denied all relief. Id. Subsequently the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 370
U.S. 908 (1962).
76. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340-44.
77. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Betts was indicted for robbery in a Maryland state court and
on arraignment asked the trial judge to appoint a lawyer for him because he could not afford
one. Id. at 456-57. Betts was advised that it was not the practice in that county to appoint
counsel for indigent defendants except in murder and rape cases. Id. at 457. He was found
guilty and sentenced to eight years in prison. Id. Subsequently, the defendant sought release
by habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the right to assistance of counsel in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Betts was denied such relief. Id. The United
States Supreme Court on certiorari affirmed the Maryland Supreme Court's decision stating
that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." Id. at 47172. Using this line of reasoning, the court further refused to accept the contention that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel for indigent federal defendants was extended to or
made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 465.
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right and is essential to a fair trial.7"
Gradually [over time] the right to counsel came to be seen as the
right to effective assistance of counsel. 79 Glasser v. United States"0
is often credited by the Supreme Court as having been the case
that defined the role of prejudice in deciding effective assistance of
counsel claims. 8 ' The Court in Glasser was presented with the issue of whether joint representation of codefendants which led to
errors at trial was sufficiently prejudicial as to diminish the effectiveness of either defendant's representation.8 2 Writing for the
Court in Glasser, Justice Murphy stated that "[tlhe right to have
the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial. '8 3 The Court distinguished between the defendant who had shown prejudice and the one who had not, and
held that only the former had been denied effective assistance of
84
counsel.

. The Court then began to focus on the effect that direct governmental interference had on the right to counsel.8 5 In the early case
of Ferguson v. Georgia"',the Court addressed the issue of whether
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause provided a criminal
defendant in a state court with the right to be questioned by his
counsel on the witness stand.87 In Ferguson, the Court reviewed a
78. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
79. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942).
80. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In Glasser, the Court had to decide whether the joint representation of codefendants caused a conflict of interest, and if so, whether such conflict of
interest was so prejudicial that it diminished the effectiveness of one defendant's representation. Id. at 75-76. The Glasser Court distinguished between the defendant who had shown
prejudice and the one who had not, and held that only the former had been denied effective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 76-77.
81. Id. at 60. Justice Murphy delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 63. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 88. Justice Jackson did not participate in the decision. Id.
82. Id. at 76.
83. Id. at 76. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, n.8, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827828, n.8, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
84. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76-77.
85. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S.Ct. 756 (1961); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891 (1972), Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550,
(1975); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330 (1976); and Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (1980).
86. 365 U.S. 570 (1961). Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion. Id. Justice
Frankfurter filed a separate opinion, joined by Justice Clark for reversing Ferguson's conviction. Id. at 598. Justice Clark filed a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 601.
87. Id. at 572.
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Georgia statute 88 providing that a criminal defendant, though not
competent to testify under oath, could make an unsworn statement
at trial.89 However, the statute did not permit defense counsel to
aid the accused by eliciting his statement through questions.9 0 The
Supreme Court held that this limitation deprived the defendant of
"the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him.''e
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 2 the Court decided a similar issue by
holding that a Tennessee statute9 3 which required that a defendant
in a criminal proceeding "desiring to testify shall do so before any
other testimony for the defense is heard. by the court trying the
case," infringed on the defendant's constitutional right to due process."4 The Court specifically held that the statutory limitation deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to assistance
9 5
of counsel.
The Supreme Court also addressed a criminal defendant's right
to final summation in a nonjury criminal trial under the Sixth
Amendment in Herring v. New York.9 Specifically in Herring, the
Court was faced with the issue of whether a New York Criminal
88. GA. CODE § 38-416 (1933). This section of the code renders a person charged with
a criminal offense incompetent to testify under oath in his own behalf at his trial: but § 38415 gives the defendant the right to make an unsworn statement to the jury without subjecting himself to cross-examination. Ga. Code § 38-415 (1933).
89. Id.
90. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 572:
91. Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
92. 406 U.S. 605 (1972). Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion, which
was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Powell. Mr. Justice Stewart joined in Part II of
the opinion and concurred in the judgment without opinion. Id. at 613. Mr. Chief Justice
Burger filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined. Id. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist also filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun joined. Id. at 617.
93. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2403 (1955). The trial court's decision to deny the defense
counsel's request to delay the petitioner's testimony until the other witness had testified was
based on a law that was originally enacted in 1887 which provided that:
§ 40-2402. In the trial of all indictments, presentments, and other criminal proceedings,
the party defendant thereto may, at his own request, but not otherwise be a competent
witness to testify therein. § 40-2403. The failure of the party defendant to make such a
request and to testify on his own behalf, shall not create any presumption against him. But
the defendant desiring to testify shall do so before any other testimony for the defense is
heard by the court trying the case.
94. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612.
95. Id. at 612-613.
96. 422 U.S. 853 (1975). The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Stewart in
which Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell joined. Id. Justice Rehnquist
filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Id. at
865.
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Statute,9 7 which conferred upon the trial judge the power to deny
the defendant's counsel the opportunity to make a final summation of the evidence before judgment is rendered, was a denial of
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel.9 "
9 ,
In its analysis, the Herring Court, citing Ferguson v. Georgia"
noted "the right to assistance of counsel has been understood to
mean that there can be no restrictions upon the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding process that has been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 0 0 The
Court reasoned that the closing argument for the defense is indeed
a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal
trial." 1 The Court also noted that "the overwhelming weight of authority, in both federal and state courts, holds that a total denial
of the opportunity for final argument in a nonjury criminal trial is
a denial of the basic right of the accused to make his defense."'0 2
The Court held that New York, in denying the defendant the right
to make a final summation, had deprived the defendant of the assistance of counsel that the Constitution guarantees. 0 3
Finally, in Geders v. United States, 04 the Court addressed the
issue of whether the trial court's order preventing the petitioner
from consulting his counsel during a 17-hour overnight recess in
the trial between his direct and cross examination deprived the petitioner of his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the
97.

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.20 (3) (c) (McKinney 1971).
98. Herring, 22 U.S. at 853-54. At the conclusion of the defendant's trial for robbery
and possession of a deadly instrument, the defendant's counsel made a motion to dismiss
the robbery charges. Id. at 856. The Court denied this motion and the defendant's counsel
then requested to "be heard somewhat on the facts." Id. The trial judge refused this request
noting that under New York law, summation is within the discretion of the judge. Id. Subsequently, the defendant was found guilty of attempted robbery in the third degree. Id.
99. 365 U.S. 570 (1961). Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. Id. Justice
Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Clark joined. Id. at 598. In Ferguson, the Supreme Court held a Georgia statute that, while permitting the defendant to make
an unsworn statement to the court and jury, prevented the defense counsel from the use of
questions to elicit the defendant's testimony. Id. at 596.
100. Herring, 422 U.S. at 857.
101. Id. at 858.
102. Id. at 859.
103. Id. at 865.
104. 425 U.S. 80 (1976). Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which all members joined except Justice Stevens who took no part in the consideration of
the case. Id. at 81. Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Brennan
joined. Id. at 92.
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Sixth Amendment.1 0 5 In evaluating the court order, the Supreme
Court noted that the judge's power to control the course of the
trial includes the broad power to sequester 0 6 witnesses "before,
during, and after" their testimony. 10 7 In this case, the trial judge
did in fact sequester all witnesses for both the prosecution and defense, and before each recess instructed the testifying witness not
to discuss his testimony with anyone. 10 8 In this case however,
Geders was not simply a witness; he was also the defendant. 10 9
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the role of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment recognizing that ordinarily the defendant is usually not able to understand and deal with the trial
process without the aid of counsel. 110 With this belief as a guiding
premise, the Court noted that there were other ways to deal with
possible improper influence on testimony or "coaching" of the witness without resorting to putting a bar on communication between
the defendant and his counsel for a 17-hour period."' Specifically
the Court noted that a prosecutor may cross-examine a defendant
as to the extent of any coaching that he may have received.112 The
Court also suggested that if the trial judge believes that the defense counsel will not observe the ethical limits on guiding wit105. Id. at 86. The petitioner in Geders was charged with conspiracy to import, with
the illegal importation of a controlled substance into the United States, and with possession
of marihuana. Id. at 81. During the course of the trial, the prosecutor asked the trial judge
to instruct Mr. Geders not to discuss the case with anyone during a 17-hour overnight recess. Id. at 82. Geders' counsel objected, claiming that he "had a right to confer with his
client about matters other than the imminent cross-examination, and that he wished to discuss problems relating to the trial with his client." Id. The trial judge over-ruled the objection and ordered Geders not to discuss his testimony with anyone during the overnight recess. Id. at 83, n.1. Geders complied with the Court order and subsequently was convicted
on all three counts. Id. at 83-85.
106. Sequester is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows: "To separate or isolate;
e.g. to sequester jurors is to isolate them from contact with the public during the course of a
sensational trial." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (5th ed. 1979).
107. Geders, 425 U.S. at 87, (citing Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91, 92 (1893);
United States v. Robinson, 502 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.Eastwood, 489 F.2d
818, 821 (5th Cir. 1974)).
108. Geders, 425 U.S. at 87-88.
109. Id. at 88.
110. Id. at 88-89. The Court specifically stated,
[tihe right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. . . .[A defendant] is unfamiliar with the rules
of evidence. . . . He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceeding against him.
Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
111. Geders, 425 U.S. at 89.
112. Id.
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nesses, he may direct that the examination of the witness continue
without interruption until it is completed. 1 3 The Court concluded
by holding that the conflict between the defendant's right to consult with his attorney during a 17-hour recess and the prosecutor's
desire to cross-examine the defendant without the risk of improper
coaching must, "under the Sixth Amendment, be resolved in favor
of the right to the assistance and guidance of counsel."1 The Supreme Court specifically noted, however, that this decision encompassed only a court order that prevented a defendant from consulting with his attorney during a 17-hour overnight recess and does
not "deal with limitations imposed in other circumstances.""' 5
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred in the
opinion '6 but emphasized that he believed that the general principals adopted by the Court for court orders barring communications
of a similar duration should also apply to any order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney."17 Justice Marshall clarified his belief by stating,
[t]he Court holds that the fear of unethical conduct is not a sufficient
ground for an order barring overnight communication between a defendant
and his attorney, and the same would hold true absent the most unusual
circumstances, I take it, for an order barring consultation between a defendant and his attorney at any time before or during the trial." 8

Under the Supreme Court's analysis in Geders, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Allen ' 9 held that the
trial court's order barring communication between one of the defendants and her attorney during the course of a overnight recess
denied her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.' 0 The Court also was faced with the issue, reserved in Geders,
of whether a trial judge may sequester a defendant and prevent
Id. at 90, (citing, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-26 (1975)
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1975)). Id. at n.3.

113.

and

114.
115.

Id at 91, (citing Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972)).
Id. at 91.

116.

Id. at 92. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision. Id.

117. Id.
118. Id. at 93.
119. 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179 (1977).
Allen was argued before the decision of the Supreme Court in Geders, but due to the similarity of issues, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals withheld this decision, awaiting instruction from the Supreme Court. Id. at 632.
120. Id. The defendants in Allen were charged with eight counts of transporting and
causing to be transported in interstate commerce stolen merchandise in excess of $5,000,
and one count of transporting and causing to be transported in interstate commerce, goods
stolen from an interstate shipment. Id.
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access to his attorney during routine short recesses in the course of
a trial.'2 1
The Allen court began its analysis by first noting that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel "is so fundamental that there should
never occur any interference with it for any length of time, however brief, absent some compelling reason."' 2 The Allen court further reasoned that the prosecutor's apprehension that the defense
counsel would unethically coach his client if given the opportunity
was "greatly exaggerated.' 2 3 The Allen court recognized the degree of difficulty in improper coaching and suggested that the occasional unethical lawyer would probably not be very adept at the
art of deceit. 2 " However, if the attorney/client team was indeed
adept in such deceit, the court noted that there remained a built-in
deterrent factor to such behavior; namely the prosecutor's opportunity to cross-examine the defendant as to the extent of any
coaching during the recess.'2 5 Finally the court noted that if the
attorney and his client are inclined to offer false testimony, it
would be of little avail to prevent contact between them during a
short recess. 2 2 The Allen court concluded by refusing to create another "nonfinal 'decision point' ", noting that if the administration
of such a rule would involve determining in each case whether
prejudice resulted, it would not be worth the cost.'2 7
Similarly in United States v. Bryant, 8 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a court order forbidding
the defendant from communicating with defense counsel during a
one hour noon recess deprived the defendant of her right to assistance of counsel. 29 The Bryant court expanded the Geders'1s0 line
of reasoning and held that "[i]n the absence of extraordinary cir121. Id. Specifically, two recesses were taken by one of the defendants. Id. The first
recess took place during the course of the defendant's direct testimony and lasted only
twenty minutes. Id. The second recess occurred at the end of his direct testimony and although the extent of the duration is unclear, the court's direction at the time was that it
would last "but a minute." Id.
122. Id. at 633.
123. Id.
124. Id. The Court specifically recognized that it takes directors of drama many hours
of teaching the proper demeanor and inflection in order to achieve a convincing performance. Id.
125. Id. (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. at 89, 96 S.Ct. at 1336).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976). In Bryant, the defendants were charged with
armed robbery. Id.
129. Id.
130. 425 U.S. 80 (1976). See supra note 104.
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cumstances," the court order was an abuse of discretion and a violation of the defendant's right to assistance of counsel.'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted with the very
same issue in United States v. Conway'32 and specifically noted
that although the Supreme Court in Geders did not address the
issue of short mid-day recesses, a number of the Circuit courts
have adopted or approved the extension of Geders to recesses of
this duration. 33 Consequently the Conway court also held that a
court order preventing the defendant from consulting counsel during a lunch break that interrupted the defendant's cross-examination deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to as34
sistance of counsel.1
In United States v. DiLapi35 , the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also addressed a Sixth Amendment challenge concerning a
court order preventing the defendant from consulting with his attorney during a brief recess called during the defendant's crossexamination. 38 While the DiLapi court noted that it is in fact error to bar attorney-defendant contact during any recess, the Court
held that the error did not warrant reversal in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Geders. 37 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reaffirmed its pre-Geders ruling expressed in United States v.
Leighton', noting that DiLapi was not prejudiced by the erroneous instruction. 39 Specifically, the Court held that the defendant
131. Bryant, 545 F.2d at 1036.
132. 632 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1980). The court order in Conway prevented the defendant
from consulting with counsel during a lunch break that interrupted the cross-examination of
the defendant. Id. at 642.
133. Id. at 643-44, (citing United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) and
United states v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179
(1977)).
134. Conway, 632 F.2d at 645.
135. 651 F.2d 140 (2nd Cir. 1981).
136. Id. at 147. Although it is not altogether clear, it appears that the recess lasted
approximately five minutes. Id. at n.8.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Leighton, 386 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1025, 88 S.Ct. 1412 (1968). In Leighton, the defendant was ordered not to consult with
counsel during a lunch recess that occurred between the defendant's direct and cross-examination. Id. at 823. While the Court held that the order was in error under the Sixth Amendment, it refused to order a new trial in the absence of any actual harm to the effective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 823.
139. DiLapi, 651 F.2d at 148-149. Specifically, the Court noted that although DILapi's
counsel objected to the court order, he did not indicate that there was some specific matter
requiring consultation nor did the defendant request such a consultation. Id. The Court also
noted that the defendant did get an opportunity to consult his attorney during a recess that
occurred during the cross-examination of a co-defendant. Id.
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may "consult with his counsel during any recess so long as the orderly conduct of the trial is not impaired."' 4
In his concurring opinion in DiLapi'4 1 , District Judge Mishler
claimed that Dilapi's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not
implicated by the court order. 4 2 He further maintained that the
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel does not include
the ability to consult counsel during cross-examination.' 4 3 He instead claimed that DiLapi's right to consult with counsel is based
entirely on his right to a fair trial provided by the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.'
Even after DiLapi, the circuit courts continued to struggle with
the application of Geders to orders concerning brief recesses. In
Bailey v. Redman 4 ", the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a defendant must demonstrate that the trial court's order deprived
him of a constitutional right which he in fact sought to exercise. 4 '
The Bailey court specifically noted that the defendant need not
show that he was prejudiced by the deprivation, but he must show
that the court order deprived him of counsel that he would have
otherwise received. 4 7 Likewise, when faced with the same issue in
Stubbs v. Bordenkircher,14 8 the Fourth Circuit held that while the
court order was constitutionally impermissible, "it was incumbent
upon the petitioner to show that he desired to consult with his
attorney, and would have consulted with him but for the restric49
tion placed upon him by the trial judge.'
140. Id. at 148.
141. Id. at 149.
142. Id The District Judge stated that the defendant's right to assistance of counsel
during his cross-examination encompasses the defense counsel's ability to object to various
questions and irregularities. Id.
143. Id. Judge Mishler maintained that in this instance the defendant must rely on
the "obligation of the Court to conduct a fair trial, and ... to preserve the integrity of the
judicial process." Id. at 150.
144. Id. The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides: "No person shall
be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. 657 F.2d 21 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153, 102 S.Ct. 1024 (1982).
146. 657 F.2d at 23-24. The Bailey Court considered the issue of whether a court order
barring the defendant from discussing his testimony with anyone during the course of an
overnight recess denied him of his right to counsel.Id.
147. Id. at 24.
148. 689 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1982). The court order in Stubbs transcended a lunch
recess called during Stubbs' direct testimony. Id.
149. Id. at 1206-1207. While comparing this factual situation to that in Geders, the
Court recognized that in Geders the defendant's counsel "vigorously" objected to the court
order. Id. The defendant and his counsel in Stubbs however did not object to the court
order, nor did they at any time request permission for such a consultation. Id.
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Finally, in Strickland v. Washington,15" the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated the standard for determining whether any claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is valid. 151 Justice O'Conner, in her majority opinion,152 stated that "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim
of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."' 53 Justice O'Conner went on to clarify that the defendant "must show
that counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the deficient
5
performance prejudiced the defense.'
In the absence of clear Supreme Court guidance, the lower
courts' treatment of right to counsel claims has led to much confusion and controversy. Specifically, since the Supreme Court's decision in Geders, the circuit courts addressing right to counsel claims
involving short recesses have struggled in their attempt to reach
palatable decisions. The Supreme Court's decision in Perry was an
attempt to provide some order to this chaotic area of the law.
The Perry Court addressed the issue of whether a court order
barring the defendant from consulting his attorney during a fifteen
minute recess was a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.' 5 5 The Court's analysis seemed to hinge specifically on the
character of the interruption. 15 As Justice Marshall noted in his
dissenting opinion, the majority holds that a defendant during a
"short" recess, unlike a "long" recess, has no constitutional right to
consult counsel. 5 7 The majority based this rationale on the belief
that any discussion during a short recess will primarily consist of
discussion regarding the defendant's ongoing testimony.' 58 While
on the other hand, the majority explained that it is reasonable to
150. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
151. 466 U.S. at 686.
152. Id. at 671. Justice O'Conner delivered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined. Id. Justice
Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 701. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 706.
153. Id. at 686. Specifically in Strickland, the respondent claimed that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a psychiatric report, by failing to investigate and present character witnesses, and by failing to seek a presentence report. Id. at 668.
154. Id. at 687.
155. Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 596.
156. Id. at 602.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 602. The Court specifically noted that when nothing but the testimony will
be discussed during a recess, the defendant has no constitutional right to receive advice
from counsel. Id.
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assume that a defendant will discuss matters that go beyond the
defendant's own testimony during the course of a "long" recess.'"5
In its attempt to distinguish between a "long" and a "short" recess, the Court appeared to be balancing the defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel with the Court's desire to preserve the "truth seeking" function of the trial. The Court began by
recognizing the fact that while a defendant has a right to consult
counsel before beginning to testify, he has no right to interrupt the
testimony in order to benefit from counsel's advice.16 0 Therefore,
the Court concluded that Perry had no reasonable expectations
that he would be permitted to consult with his attorney during an
interruption caused by the trial judge.'"' The Supreme Court justified this belief by citing a general "rul[e]" that forbids attorneywitness contact between the witness' direct and cross-examination.
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion however, the
Court cited no authority for such a rule.''
While the majority focuses primarily on the likelihood that a defendant will discuss his ongoing testimony with his counsel during
a short recess, the Court specifically notes that the fact that similar discussion will "inevitably occur" during the course of a long
recess does not compromise the defendant's basic right to consult
counsel.6 3 Yet the Court fails to provide any insight as to when a
recess is long enough to create the possibility of the defendant discussing non-testimonial matters with his attorney. Instead, as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent, this decision leaves the trial
judge to guess whether he is restricting the defendant's constitutional rights by issuing a recess bar order.""4
The Court's concern in preserving the truth seeking function is
couched in the belief that the defendant will be able to regain "a
poise and sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not
possess," if given the opportunity to consult counsel during the period between direct and cross-examination.'6 5 However, as the
159. Id. In his majority opinion , Justice Stevens noted that the defendant does have a
constitutional right to discuss matters that are not related to the defendant's testimony
during the course of a "long" recess. Id. He also explained that the fact that such discussions might "inevitably include some consideration of the defendant's ongoing testimony
does not compromise that basic right." Id.
160. 109 S.Ct. at 600.
161. Id. at 604.
162. Id.at 604.
163. Id. at 602
164. Id. at 608, (citing Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d at 1037).
165. Id. at 601. The Court explained that a witness that is uncoached between direct
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Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Allen, it takes drama
instructors hours, not minutes, to teach correct inflection and demeanor to an accomplished actor in order that he achieve a convincing performance. 6 Furthermore, should the attorney and client be adept in the art of deception, the court noted that the
ability to cross-examine should serve as a deterrent to the possibility of any unethical coaching. 16 7 This fact was recognized by Mr.
Chief Justice Burger in writing for the Court in Geders. He specifically stated in his majority opinion that "[t]he opposing counsel in
the adversary system is not without weapons to cope with
'coached' witnesses. A prosecutor may cross-examine a defendant
as to the extent of any 'coaching' during a recess, subject, of
course, to the control of the court. 1 6 8 Yet the Perry court fails to
explain why cross-examination serves as a deterrent for "long" recesses but fails to deter unethical coaching during shorter recesses.
The Supreme Court has long expressed the view that a defendant's assistance of counsel guarantee under the Federal Constitution specifically encompasses the defendant's right to consult counsel about all aspects of his case. As the Supreme Court stated in
Powell, the defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel during
every step in the proceedings against him."1 9 This view has been
upheld by every Court of Appeals to consider this issue since the
Supreme Court's decision in Geders. Specifically, these Courts
have held that a bar on attorney defendant contact, even during a
brief recess, is impermissible if objected to by counsel. 1 °
In the Court's attempt to balance the defendant's constitutional
right to assistance of counsel with the desire to preserve the "truth
seeking function" of trial, it appears to have somewhat ignored its
own precedents. The Perry Court also failed to provide trial judges
with guidelines for discerning when a "short" recess bar order becomes a constitutionally impermissible "long" recess bar order. By
failing to draw a discernable line between such bars, the Court, as
Justice Marshall put it, "guarantees a new bout of appellate litigaand cross-examination is more likely to lead to the discovery of truth than a witness that is
permitted to consult with his counsel during this period. Id. Justice Stevens based this belief on the fact that it is an adversarial system as opposed to one of "inquisitorial justice."
Id.
166. Allen, 542 F.2d at 633.
167. Id.
168. Geders, 425 U.S. at 89.
169. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
170. See e.g. Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.denied, 109 S.Ct. 594
(1988).
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tion during which lower courts ineluctably will issue conflicting decisions." 1
Thomas Edgington

171.

Perry, 109 S.Ct. at 608.

